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Abstract 
The beam dumping system of the Large Hadron 
Collider (LHC) provides a loss-free fast extraction of the 
circulating beams. It consists per ring of 15 extraction 
kickers, followed by 15 septum magnets, 10 dilution 
kickers and an external absorber. A dump request can 
occur at any moment during the operation of the collider, 
from injection energy up to collision energy. All kickers 
must fire synchronously with the beam abort gap to 
properly extract the whole beam in one single turn into 
the extraction channel. Incorrect operation of the 
extraction kickers can lead to beam losses and severe 
damage to the machine. The control system of the LHC 
beam dump kickers is based on a modular architecture 
composed of 4 different sub-systems, each with a specific 
function, in order to detect internal failures, to ensure a 
correct extraction trajectory over the whole LHC 
operational range, to synchronise and distribute dumps 
requests, and to analyse the transient signals recorded 
during the beam dumping process. The control 
architecture is presented and the different steps performed 
for its validation, from the individual sub-systems tests to 
the final commissioning with beam, are described. 
INTRODUCTION 
The function of the LHC beam dumping system 
(LBDS) is to fast extract the circulating beam in a low-
loss way from each ring of the collider and to transport it 
to an external absorber with the appropriate beam dilution 
in order to not overheat the absorber material. The LBDS 
is installed around the LHC long straight section 6 and 
consists, per ring, of 15 extraction kickers, 15 septum 
magnets, 10 dilution kickers, and finally an external 
dump, mounted in a separate cavern some hundred meters 
away from the LHC ring. 
A beam dump request can occur at any moment during 
the operation of the collider, from the injection energy of 
450 GeV up to the collision energy of 7 TeV. Each of the 
two sets of extraction kickers must operate synchronously 
with the 3 μs long beam abort gap foreseen for the rise of 
the kicker field, to deflect the beam safely away from the 
machine into the extraction channel, in one single turn of 
89 μs. 
Incorrect operation of the extraction kickers can lead to 
full or partial beam loss and thus to severe damage to the 
machine, to the experiments or to the beam dumping 
system itself. The extraction kickers are therefore one of 
the most critical components of the LBDS [1], in terms of 
potential impact but also in terms of complexity. 
Consequently great attention has been paid to their 
design and to their commissioning with the aim to achieve 
a high level of reliability during their operation with 
beam. 
KICKER SYSTEM CONTROL 
The performance of the LBDS kicker systems is 
determined by three operational parameters: their state, 
their kick time and their kick strength. To reflect this the 
control architecture comprises three independent 
subsystems, each one dedicated to the control of one 
specific parameter: the state control and surveillance 
system (SCSS), the trigger synchronisation and 
distribution system (TSDS) and the beam energy tracking 
system (BETS). In addition, a fourth subsystem, the fast 
acquisition and analysis system (FAAS), has been 
implemented to check the waveforms of the pulsed 
signals. 
The global status of the LBDS kicker system is 
determined by the sum of the individual status of all its 
subsystems. It can either be in a ready state when the 
system is in operation, in a pulse state during the 
execution of the dump or in a not ready state in case of 
internal failure. 
When in the ready state, a continuous surveillance 
implemented through a redundant fail-safe logic protects 
the system against internal failures. In case of a failure, a 
synchronous internal self-trigger is issued in order to 
dump the beam. On the contrary, during the pulse state, 
no reaction to failure of the dump action itself is possible. 
In order to protect the system against possible failures, a 
redundant fault tolerant logic is used with in-depth post 
operational checks to verify the correct operation of all 
the redundant circuits during the last dump action. 
Surveillance 
The surveillance of the LBDS kicker systems is based 
on a fail-safe multi-master programmable logic controller 
(PLC) architecture for the SCSS and on LynxOS VME 
front-ends with dedicated hardware and their embedded 
software for the BETS and the TSDS. 
When in a ready state, the surveillance checks all the 
critical signals which can affect the safety of the system 
in case of failure like the charging voltage of the kicker 
high voltage generators with respect to the beam energy, 
the correct locking of the trigger synchronisation with the 
beam revolution frequency, the low-level interlock 
conditions, and the status of the high voltage switches. 
The surveillance thresholds have been adjusted in such a 
way that even if they are reached the dump action will 
still be correctly executed. 
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Internal post operational checks 
The aim of the internal post operation checks (IPOC) is 
to verify that the beam dump hardware operated correctly 
during the last dump action. This verification requires 
acquisition of all transient signals during the dump action 
within the SCSS, TSDS, BETS and FAAS subsystems. 
The acquired signals are analysed and correlated with 
each other in order to determine how well the sub-systems 
carried out their task during the dump action and to 
ensure that no damage was caused on components of the 
dump system itself. To ensure this, a high precision data 
acquisition and analysis of the 50 magnet current pulse 
shapes is performed within the FAAS by a set of 
CompactPCI crates running LINUX and housing National 
Instruments PXI-5122 digitisers with 14 bit resolution and 
100 MS/s sampling rate. 
The LBDS will be declared ready for the next dump by 
the IPOC if, and only if, it can be confirmed that all the 
hardware has operated correctly during the last dump 
action and if it can be expected that all hardware, 
including all redundant components, will be able to 
respond correctly to the next dump request. 
External post operational checks 
The aim of the external post operation checks (XPOC) 
is to verify that the executed beam dump was performed 
without faults, by analysing and correlating hardware 
signals form equipment and beam measurements. 
In addition to a fully redundant analysis of the 
extraction and dilution kicker current waveforms with 
individual references and tighter tolerance limits, the 
XPOC system also analyses the measurements taken by 
the beam instrumentation during the dump action: 
 The beam position in the extraction channel; 
 The beam image of the screen just in front of the 
dump block; 
 The beam intensities in the dump channel and in the 
machine; 
 The beam losses in the extraction channel and at the 
collimators distributed over the machine; 
 The beam population in the abort gap; 
 The vacuum pressure in the extraction channel. 
COMMISSIONING 
During its life cycle, the control of the kicker systems 
will be sensitive to different types of failures (infant, 
random, design, systematic, wear-out…) which will affect 
directly the reliability of the complete LBDS system. 
In order to reduce the impact of these different failures, 
a strategy (Table 1) to fully test, validate and commission 
the LBDS before normal operation with beam has been 
implemented. 
Table 1: Commissioning strategy 
Failure Protection 
Design  Reliability, Availability, Maintainability 
and Safety (RAMS) studies 
 Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) studies 
 Reviews 
Infant  Individual system test 
 Reliability run 
 Dry run 
Random  Surveillance 
 IPOC & XPOC 
Wear-out  XPOC 
Reviews 
In order to confirm the design choices and to check 
their correct implementation, a series of technical reviews 
has been performed. 
Firstly, the conceptual design of the LBDS has been 
reviewed in the frame of the LHC machine protection 
system review. The outcome of this general review was a 
clear recommendation to organise more detailed reviews 
of the most critical systems like the LBDS. 
In accordance with this recommendation, all the LBDS 
kicker control subsystems (SCSS, TSDS, BETS, FAAS, 
IPOC, XPOC) have been reviewed in details in the frame 
of a technical audit lasting one full week. The auditors 
concluded that the design and the implementation of the 
LBDS kicker controls is sound, complete, straightforward 
and, in particular, conform to the requirement of a high 
inherent level of safety, reliability and availability. 
Nevertheless, a list of recommendations for the different 
subsystems has been established, some needs for 
clarification of interdependencies definition between 
equipment have been identified, and a strong 
recommendation for the organisation of parallel peer-
reviews of VHDL and PLC code has been made. 
A follow-up of this audit has been organised one year 
later in order review the progress made in the 
implementation of the different recommendations. The 
auditors noted that the reliability runs have impressively 
shown the proper functioning of the IPOC and XPOC 
systems and that 60 % of the recommendations of the 
initial audit have been implemented, with the remaining 
ones being implemented during 2009. They confirmed 
their recommendation to perform a full review of FPGA 
code and to deploy FPGA test benches 
Accordingly to this recommendation, a series of 
external reviews by industry of the most critical 
components of the different subsystems has been 
launched. The objectives are the validation of the correct 
implementation of the functional requirements, the 
verification of the pre-series performance, the 
identification of possible hardware and/or software 
anomalies, the recommendation for possible 
improvements and the proposal of guidelines of possible 
maintenance procedures for the embedded software. 
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Reliability runs 
The main objectives of the reliability runs were to 
validate FMECA and RAMS studies for the LBDS kicker 
systems, to pass the burn-in period for all the hardware 
installed and to setup and optimise the IPOC and XPOC 
analyses [2]. For the reliability runs, the two LBDS have 
been operated in the LHC tunnel for an average effective 
running period of almost two months. During this period 
750000 magnet current pulses, corresponding to more 
than 10 years of normal operation, have been executed 
and the resulting data successfully acquired and analysed 
by IPOC and XPOC [3]. 
The most important overall result from the reliability 
runs is that, for the LBDS kicker systems, no critical 
failures occurred which would have resulted in a non-
acceptable beam dump. Nevertheless, different types of 
failures have been recorded either by the surveillance 
system (high voltage switch failures or fuse breakdowns 
in power trigger units) or by the IPOC and XPOC systems 
(flashover in a dilution magnet, spontaneous firing of one 
generator correctly followed by a re-triggering of the 
remaining generator, burn-in degradation of self-healing 
capacitor in the generator high voltage circuit or bad 
reconnection of a power trigger cable after an 
intervention). 
Dry runs 
Regular dry runs of the LBDS systems were carried out 
throughout 2008 until 10 September, overlapping with an 
intense phase of machine check-out during the last weeks 
before first beam. The main objective of this series of dry 
runs was to test and validate the integration of the LBDS 
control within the accelerator control system. 
At this occasion, all LBDS interdependencies (beam 
interlock system, revolution frequency, access system, 
beam energy acquisition…) have been individually tested 
and commissioned. In addition, remote operation from the 
control room has been performed with a progressive boot-
strapping of the application program layer including the 
validation of the sequencer, the fixed displays, the 
operator and expert applications, the management of 
critical settings, the Roles Based Access (RBAC), the 
analogue signal acquisition and viewer, the logging 
system, and other components. 
Commissioning with beam 
The main objective of the commissioning with beam 
[4] is to check that the expected performance of the 
LBDS is reached over the complete operational range.  
In September 2008, the commissioning with beam has 
been started at 450 GeV and first beams have been 
successfully dumped either in inject & dump mode, in 
circulate & dump mode or upon request of the machine 
protection system. 
Work has started on the commissioning of the beam 
instrumentation, the steering of the extraction trajectories, 
the fine-tuning of the kicker synchronisation and the 
validation of the XPOC analysis. 
ISSUES 
During the different commissioning phases of the 
LBDS kicker control, some weak points have been 
identified as a potential source of faults which can affect 
the reliability of the LBDS during exploitation. The 
principal points of concern are: 
 Missing version management and code modification 
tracking tools within the SIEMENS S7 PLC software 
development framework; 
 Dependence on changes in the accelerator control 
framework (common libraries) at the application and 
front-end level; 
 Lack of remote low-level diagnostic for the 
redundant fault-tolerant systems; 
 Maintenance, test and re-validation of software 
(application, front-end, embedded and PLC); 
 Missing automated test procedures for re-validation 
of the complete system after hardware and/or 
software modifications. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The combination of fail-safe industrial components and 
the extensive use of redundant solutions, either in a fail-
safe or in a fault-tolerant approach, result in a highly 
reliable control architecture. This high level of reliability 
is strengthened by the ability to declare the LBDS to be 
“as-good-as-new” after each dump action on the basis of 
the IPOC and XPOC results. During the LBDS 
commissioning, a series of reviews has validated the 
technical choices while reliability runs, dry runs and 
commissioning with beam have successfully 
demonstrated its correct functioning and confirmed its 
reliability level. Nevertheless, the maintenance of the 
LBDS control remains an issue in order to avoid the 
introduction of systematic failures during its life cycle. 
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